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Past as global trade governance prelude 
Reconfiguring debate about reform of the multilateral trading system1 
 
 
Claiming that the multilateral trading system is dysfunctional, outmoded, and in need 
of repair is far from revelatory.  We need look no further than the inability of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) member states to agree a far-reaching agreement on trade 
during the Doha round, the tortuous passage of the negotiations themselves, the 
change in system-governance that resulted from Doha’s abandonment, or the history of 
asymmetrical deals that have resulted from previous rounds of multilateral negotiations, 
for ample illustration.2  Equally, it is folly to expect that such a claim is sufficiently 
novel to hold attention, generate contemplation and cause fresh thinking.3  That the 
primary means of governing global trade is in need of reform is news to no one—
particularly to those that have long been seeking to make the system fit-for-purpose, or 
else seek its abandonment. That a clarion call for institutional reform has been audible 
for some considerable time—but has yet to be heeded—is only marginally more 
newsworthy. 4   
 
Yet, such is the degree of fatigue surrounding global trade governance that even those 
that were once deeply critical of the iniquitous functioning of the multilateral trading 
system have now added their chest fall to the collective sigh of relief exuded when it 
appears to function in any fashion—as it appeared to do at the conclusion of the WTO’s 
Bali (December 2013) and Nairobi (December 2015) ministerial conferences.5  The 
result—to reverse George Orwell’s observation of Bertrand Russell’s Power: A New Social 
Analysis—is that we have ceased to treat ‘the restatement of the obvious’ as our ‘first 
duty’ allowing instead system atrophy to become acceptable and institutional malaise 
normal.6 
 
Part of the problem lies with the narrowness of the terrain upon which the debate has 
unfolded.  With a few notable interventions that have sought to challenge the WTO’s 
existence or else seek its abandonment,7 the majority of contributions have sought to 
offer specific measures to address problems perceived with particular aspects of its 
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operation; the need to embrace variable geometry and plurilateralism in negotiating; 
the desirability of clearly delineating (and indeed limiting) the WTO’s remit to avoid 
mission creep and thus negating some of the pressures for reform; embedding the 
WTO more coherently in the broader pantheon of global governance institutions; and 
opening up decision-making to take account of changes in global economic geography.8   
 
This tendency for ‘inside the box’ thinking has a real consequence: it puts forward 
solutions that, though addressing aspects of poor operation, would ultimately 
perpetuate a problematic system. This would not alter the fact that future trade 
negotiations would most likely produce outcomes that are not markedly different from 
those of previous rounds.  Of course, this does not rule out reforms of value being 
implemented in the near future.  It does mean, however, that in the absence of a 
fundamental departure from existing ways of operating, few prospects exist for the 
realisation of development gains for all or for a new era in multilateral trade.  More 
significantly—for the purposes of this paper—because these piecemeal suggestions keep 
the institution largely intact they do not convey a sense of the pressing need for reform. 
 
Other factors have also rendered less-than-urgent the need to take reform of the 
multilateral trading system seriously.  At play here is a reluctance to press for 
substantive reform despite the system’s imperfections because the WTO is widely held 
to be preferable to bilateral and/or mega-regional forms of governance;9 it is perceived 
to be a bulwark against protectionism;10 and other events in global commerce and 
world politics more generally have served to divert attention—including, but not limited 
to, the Trump administration’s position on trade and the UK’s exit from the European 
Union (EU).11  Yet, settling for a system that represents a lesser evil and which is 
perceived to be functioning—however imperfectly—as a means of mitigating commercial 
discrimination is not reason enough to persist with an outmoded form of governance, 
particularly one that has consistently delivered asymmetrical trade gains,12 and which, 




Opting for system maintaining rather than system transforming reform—whether it is 
the product of political opportunity, expediency, possibility or otherwise—has a 
profound effect: it limits the realm of what is understood to be viable by locking in 
place behaviour that can only ever produce slight variations of the status-quo.  Just as 
allowing third party amicus curiae submissions14 does little to nullify the power political 
aspects of WTO dispute settlement processes, facilitating effective forms of trade-led 
development is unlikely to result from a persistence with modes of operation that have 
been found not to serve the interests of developing country members.  What is needed 
instead, is a clear departure from existing debate about the minor inadequacies of trade 
governance and the small pool of ideas that have so far had any purchase, toward a 
conversation that acknowledges reform as essential and urgent and which sets about 
working out how that reform can be brought about.  
 
How then can we re-orientate debate about the problems of trade governance such that 
it once again becomes a serious item on global agendas and conducted in such a way 
that we understand substantive reform to constitute more than just minor fettling?  The 
answer probably does not lie in regurgitating well-known critiques of the functioning of 
the multilateral trading system or of the travails of the now-set-aside Doha round.  One 
place where purchase may be found is in changing the shape of debate such that the 
problems of the multilateral trading system currently constructed are set within a 
broader historical context which is able to use an analysis of the past as a basis for 
projecting forward to illuminate the problems of the future.  Such an approach ought 
to be able to illustrate the dramatic variance that exists between the speed with which 
real world circumstances change, the relative sloth of the processes by which 
institutional evolution is brought about, and the factors that combine to produce 
repetitive forms of institutional behaviour and outcome that do little other than 
preserve the status quo.  This, in turn, reveals not only how out-of-step with 
circumstance, need and aspiration the existing institutional architecture is—and will 
become—but also the urgency with which a programme of substantive reform is required.   
 
In other words, one way of illustrating and reconstituting the extent to which the 
multilateral trading system is in need of fundamental reform is to explore the changed 
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nature of the political and economic environment in which it operates and to do so 
alongside an examination of its own evolution.  These two aspects—or speeds of change 
(one circumstantial, the other institutional)—can then be used to project forward to 
consider the likely future shape of the global environment and of trade governance. In 
so doing, the problems and shortcomings of global trade governance, not only 
historically and contemporarily but also future-wise, can be highlighted.  This, in turn, 
can provide a platform upon which a more effective future-orientated system of trade 
governance can be imagined, debated and ultimately built. 
 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to advance the ‘pressing need’ side of this equation 
by exploring the capacity of the multilateral system to govern global trade—in terms of 
its appropriateness as a tool for managing trade in given political and economic 
circumstances—in the past and the present as well as by imagining how it might do so in 
the future.  The reason for this is simple and worth restating: extant debate has so far 
failed to establish the pressing need for reform of the multilateral trading system.  
Rather, a relatively low level of ambition has combined with recent events to push 
issues of reform into the background.  Thus, my purpose is to offer a different way of 
explaining why reform of the multilateral trading system is pressing and ought to be 
brought back to the fore.  It is on this platform that debate can then begin about the 
form that a future and thoroughly reimagined multilateral trading system might take.15 
 
In pursuit of its aims, the paper explores the capacity of the multilateral system to 
govern global trade at three moments in time.  It does this to offer three clear snap-
shots of trade governance in operation as a means of highlighting how out of step with 
changing economic and political circumstances it has become.  Rather than begin with 
the creation of the multilateral trading system and pick two moments that follow 
thereafter, the paper takes a century as its analytical timeframe and lays this either side 
of the current moment so that it reflects back 50 years on the present day and half-a-
century into the future.  The reasons for this choice of timeframe are as follows.  As is 
well known the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—and the WTO’s 
predecessor institution) emerged out of the post-war failure to establish the 
International Trade Organization (ITO).  Beginning this study in 1947 at the GATT’s 
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creation would only highlight the system’s ‘birth defects’, its happenstantial beginnings, 
and its sui generis character, all of which are covered amply elsewhere.16  It would tell us 
little of the system once it had become established and was in operation—that is, how 
the GATT actually governed global trade and its congruity with political-economic need 
at the time.   
 
The use of a century as an analytical timeframe—with the present day serving as the 
fulcrum—thus gives us a neat entry point to thinking about the fit between the GATT 
and contemporary political and economic circumstance half-a-century ago (some 20 
years after the conclusion of the General Agreement), before considering what its 
successor the WTO is like today and what may lie 50 years ahead.  By using these three 
discrete moments in time we are able to compare and contrast how circumstances and 
the institution have changed as well as the effect on the fit between global trade 
governance and the environment in which it is operating.  And by focusing on three 
discrete periods rather than on every single institutional and circumstantial 
development across a 100 year time period—a worthy but lengthier and impossible task, 
especially projecting forward—we are able to see with greater clarity the consequences of 
change. 
 
Thus, the paper begins by exploring the global political and economic environment, 
and the status and evolution of the system of trade governance, a half century ago—a 
point by which the system had been up-and-running for almost 2 decades and the 
anomalies of its institutional birth overcome.17  It then moves on to consider how those 
circumstances have changed as well as what kind of evolution trade governance has 
undergone to make sense of the present.  Thereafter, the paper imagines what global 
political and economic circumstances might look like 50 years from now setting these 
alongside the projected likely future evolution of the multilateral trading system.  The 
purpose here is not to predict the future but rather to illustrate and better appreciate 
the likely disjuncture between political and economic circumstance and institutional 
development, thereby underscoring the necessity of reform and establishing 
foundations for renewed debate.  
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Global trade governance circa 1966 
World order looked dramatically different in late 1960s than it does today, though 
some things have endured.  In the two decades that had passed since the end of the 
Second World War, the United States had consolidated its position as the most 
dominant state in the Western world and was locked in a cold war with the Soviet 
Union.  Europe was reconstructing into two blocs following dramatically different 
political-economic models—one socialist, the other market orientated—with few 
substantive relations beyond minor diplomatic courtesy, and some low level (albeit 
rising) commercial interaction.18  The pre-war unravelling of the European empires had 
continued apace, often without thought for the borders and states that decolonisation 
was to create.  A world institutional architecture had been created under the auspices of 
the United Nations (UN), overseen by a security council of four permanent and self-
declared nuclear members (the fifth, China—also a nuclear weapons state—was 
precluded from taking up its seat until 1971) though it had been largely paralysed by 
the cold war. Part of this wider UN institutional architecture consisted of economic 
institutions designed to manage exchange rates (the International Monetary Fund) and 
oversee loans for reconstruction (and increasingly development—the World Bank).  
And a series of regional institutions have been created to do in continental groups what 
the UN’s architects had hoped would be possible on a global scale.   
 
While Europe had enjoyed one of the longest periods of peace since before the First 
World War, cold war rivalries were fought out in proxy conflicts throughout the 
decolonising world.  A series of countries had risen to the fore and enjoyed 
considerable economic growth.  Some of these states had done so by banding together 
to overcome weakness and as a means of preventing further hostilities—as Europe had 
in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC); others were beginning to 
‘emerge’ under the broad umbrella of US military protection, as with Japan and South 
Korea; others still had become wealthy on the back of fossil fuel extraction, as was 
beginning to be the case with the members of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).  The UK and France (and to a lesser extent the 
Netherlands) had reconstituted relations with their former colonies in 
intergovernmental organisations (notably in the form of the Commonwealth and the 
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French Union and French Community).  The UK was not a member of the EEC but 
was the biggest economy in the European Free Trade Area. The result was a world 
divided into four distinct regions: the advanced capitalist countries; a Sino-Soviet bloc 
(albeit profoundly fractured by ideological differences); a group of largely Asian 
countries developing on the back of strong economic intervention and political 
illiberalism; and a large group of economies—some of which were independent states, 
others of which were not—largely cut off from the global economy other than via 
processes of commodity extraction. 
 
By 1966, the centrepiece of the multilateral trading system—the GATT—had risen from 
the ashes of the ITO project and been up and running for almost two decades.  Yet, its 
contribution to global economic governance was far from clear-cut.  Many of the trade 
restrictions that had existed among the industrialised countries in manufactured 
products had been swept aside.  And a clear view had emerged that the international 
trading system was highly disadvantageous to developing countries and it already 
required a substantial overhaul if it was to have a positive impact on realising economic 
gains for all countries.19   
 
In reflecting on the GATT’s contribution to post-war European recovery Douglas Irwin 
put it, 
 
One is left with tremendous uncertainty about the precise role of the GATT 
... Its role was almost surely secondary to sound domestic macro-economic 
and microeconomic policies. After all, the GATT did not achieve much for 
an entire decade after the 1947 tariff cuts and the 1949 membership 
expansion. These initial tariff cuts did not fully take hold until other trade 
restrictions were eliminated over the course of the 1950s. And the trade 
liberalization of the 1950s that was of substantial importance took place 
outside of the GATT.20  
 
Instead, Irwin finds that the GATT’s major contribution was in establishing itself as the 
primary reference point for global trade governance and in serving as a ratchet against 
backsliding on the tariff liberalisation that had been achieved.  As he argues, it was not 
until the mid-1960s (during the Kennedy round of trade negotiations, 1964-7) that a 
claim could be made that the GATT had overseen significant cuts in barriers to trade.21   
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Where the GATT’s contribution is less ambiguous is in fostering economic 
development and prosperity in the non-Western world.  Here the record is clear.  The 
GATT offered very little of use to the world’s newly independent poor.  This is not 
surprising as the GATT was not designed to be a development institution.  Its genesis 
from a provisional and, for some commentators, a ‘surprising’ and ‘accidental’ 22 
agreement designed to kick-start the process of tariff liberalisation in the post-war era 
dominated by colonial states ensured that its initial evolution reflected the interests of 
its original contracting parties (particularly the United States and to a lesser extent the 
United Kingdom) and the purposes for which it was deployed.  Agriculture and, later, 
textiles and clothing, were excluded from its remit, with negotiations focused on freeing 
up trade in those products deemed drivers of post-war recovery: manufactures, semi-
manufactured and capital goods. 23   What contribution the GATT had made to 
prosperity was a result of any increases in the volume and value of trade in these goods 
and not in those that were of interest to much of what would become known as the 
developing world—a state of affairs which, in turn, added weight to calls for its reform.24  
 
Part of the problem was that even by the late 1960s, after an initial expansion of the 
number of contracting parties had occurred, the GATT was far from a genuinely 
universal—that is, truly ‘global’—institution.  Not only was the process of accession 
heavily policed, its circuit of expansion first took in the remainder of allied and non-
socialist industrial countries that had not signed on in 1947 before extending outwards 
to include the remaining ‘advanced’ economies.  Only when decolonisation was in full 
swing in the late 1950s and 1960s—when newly-independent states were seeking to join 
international institutions as markers of their independence and former colonial states 
were keen to sponsor their entry—did GATT membership expand.  Even then, however, 
expansion was relatively slow, particularly compared with other global institutions.  
Moreover, the GATT’s essential character altered very little as the focus of operations 
remained on liberalising those areas of trade of interest to its core members.  The result 
was that while the number of signatories to the General Agreement may have grown from 
23 to 69 by 1966 it had not shed its origins as a ‘trader’s club’ focused on pursuing 
trade advantages in areas of interest to the leading industrial states.25  It was, as David 
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Howell put it, a ‘piece of machinery suited … to the trade policies and objectives of the 
already industrialized countries’.26 
 
Three reasons explain this less-than-universal membership, which are relevant here and 
which combine to underline the character of the multilateral trading system to explain 
some of why the institution has evolved in the way that it has and why it has failed to 
keep pace with changes in political-economic circumstance.  First, during the cold war 
the GATT operated more like a mega-regional trade institution than a universal 
endeavour.  Although accession to the General Agreement was open to the Soviet Union 
and its satellite states, given the centrality of trade liberalisation to Western capitalism, 
the participation of these states was limited.27  As Francine McKenzie puts it, the GATT 
was ‘an organization that came to be closely associated with the members and cause of 
the West’. 28   Some of the Eastern bloc states did accede to the GATT but they 
remained nominal participants at best; and US support for the accession of these 
countries was more geostrategic, designed to open up fractures in the Soviet bloc, than 
it was economic.  Pre-socialist Czechoslovakia was a founding member of the GATT.  
Yugoslavia—a market socialist outlier and a rare Eastern European exception in that it 
was not a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA, also Comecon)—
acceded in 1966.  Poland followed in 1969 with Romania (1971) and Hungary (1973) 
acceding soon thereafter.  Indeed, even the Soviet Union attempted to join the GATT, 
lodging an application to take part in the Uruguay round—which was, unsurprisingly, 
opposed by the United States.29  The result was that without Soviet bloc membership 
and the concessions, politicking and institutional adjustments that opposition might 
have brought, the GATT contracting parties were able to concentrate on the task at 
hand, with institutional membership having the added effect of contributing to 
Western bloc cohesion.  
 
Second, in contrast to the UN which required that the ‘peace-loving’ credentials of a 
state be established before granting membership, 30  accession to the GATT was 
governed by a procedure whereby existing signatories would agree a ‘price’ for entry 
with a candidate state.31  The value of this ‘price’ or ticket to entry was determined by 
the relative significance of the candidate state and the likely threat it posed to existing 
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GATT contracting party markets, with the ticket to entry being more costly the greater 
the significance and competitiveness of a prospective signatory.  The price of accession 
also depended on various political considerations. Many newly independent states 
acceded relatively automatically under the sponsorship of their former colonial powers 
with very little demanded of them—so called ‘grandfathering’. Others had accession 
processes that were more drawn out and involved much more costly tickets to entry, as 
was the case with Japan.  What was common to both groups, however, were the relative 
disadvantages that accession brought.  For newly independent states, accession was 
often presented as a fait accompli with little regard for—or involvement of—
constituencies representing domestic economic interests, or for issues of key economic 
importance.  For countries like Japan, the terms of accession were so unfavourable that 
upon acceding to the GATT 40 per cent of the contracting parties operationalised a 
non-application clause nullifying many of the benefits of membership.32 
 
Third, although the ranks of the GATT were added to by those new signatories that 
sought to accede in the post-war years, a large proportion were not actually involved in 
the General Agreement’s trade barrier reducing activities.  Nor was it the case that the 
contracting parties as a whole were bound by the outcome of each round of 
negotiations.  Indeed, once the second round had been completed in 1949 it was not 
until the Uruguay round (1986-1994) that all of the contracting parties agreed to be 
bound by the results of the negotiations.   Even then not all the contracting parties that 
agreed to be bound by the results were actively engaged in the discussions.  Whereas, 
successive rounds saw the United States and the other leading industrial countries 
exchange concessions further stimulating trade in manufactured, semi-manufactured 
and industrial goods but not in agriculture or textiles and clothing.  Those countries 
that chose not, or were unable to participate in the negotiations did not benefit from 
the concession exchanging activities of their industrial counterparts.  The result was to 
widen the gap between the opportunities afforded to the industrial states and their 
developing counterparts while at the same time excluding the latter from any say in the 




The disparity in the price of accession is worth dwelling on a little more because it gives 
us an insight into both the plurilateral character of the GATT—that is, as an agreement 
that was relevant at that time only to a particular subset of members—and the reasons 
why a distinct disjuncture has occurred between the pace of institutional evolution and 
changes in political and economic circumstances globally as well as among participants.  
By 1966 the European and North American economies were booming, with trade in 
manufactures driving prosperity.  Allied security was secured through an institutional 
apparatus that comprised both global and regional security and economic institutions.  
European reconstruction continued apace, and peace—at least at home—continued to 
endure.  In this the GATT played a role.  Not only was it an important component of 
the Western economic architecture, the programme of liberalisation agreed under its 
auspices had begun to bear fruit in terms of the trade opportunities that were opened 
up and the areas wherein protection was allowed to persist (namely agriculture, and 
textiles and clothing). 
 
Matters were quite different outside of the European and North American core.  The 
focus on the liberalisation of manufactured, semi-manufactured and capital goods 
proved to be of little relevance to the largely agricultural and primary producing 
economies that had managed to accede to the GATT.  Indeed, only 14 per cent of all 
developing country exports at this time were from manufactured goods, with textiles 
and clothing from India, Pakistan and Hong Kong comprising a significant proportion 
thereof. 33   Moreover, GATT negotiations had actively excluded areas of economic 
importance to the newly independent world to the extent that agricultural markets 
remained highly protected and trade in textiles and clothing subject to significant 
quantitative restrictions and other protective measures.   
 
The bias in the manner in which the GATT’s rules were applied, as well as the residual 
disadvantages facing newly independent countries in a post-colonial world, did not go 
unnoticed.  Pressure was exerted both among the contracting parties as well as in the 
UN more generally for a dramatic reorientation towards the needs of developing 
countries.  Among GATT contracting parties, this pressure resulted in the adoption in 
1964 (in force on a de facto basis from 8 February 1965) of Part IV of the General 
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Agreement.  Outside, it culminated in the establishment of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was, as the inaugural issue 
of the Development Policy Review put it, set up to have ‘a serious debate about the merits 
of the present system of world trade – symbolised by the GATT with its most favoured 
nation clause – as a means of promoting economic development’.34  Both endeavours 
were ultimately to come in for much criticism.  As Reginald Green put it, both the 
GATT negotiations and the first UNCTAD were ‘an elaborate sham, and the goals and 
aspirations of 1960-64 … vain illusions on the part of Africa and the Tiers Monde 
[Third World] and pious hypocrisy on the part of the industrial world’.35 
 
Unsurprisingly, neither Part IV nor UNCTAD resulted in much that was of substance.  
As T. N. Srinivasan put it, under Part IV the ‘less developed countries achieved little by 
way of precise commitments … but a lot in terms of verbiage’. 36   Part IV merely 
committed developed countries (and their less developed counterparts in relation to 
trade among themselves) to: (i) give high priority to the reduction and elimination of 
barriers to trade for goods of export interest to their developing counterparts; (ii) 
refrain from introducing or increasing customs duties or non-tariff barriers on those 
goods; and (iii) avoid imposing or making any adjustments in existing fiscal measures 
that would hamper demand for products from developing countries.  It also removed 
the requirement for reciprocity for any concessions made during trade negotiations; 
and it put into place a mechanism for reporting and surveillance.  Nothing in Part IV 
was compelling and it had little impact as a result.  The debate did, however, serve to 
further entrench growing developing country hostility towards the shape and direction 
of multilateral trade regulation. 
 
UNCTAD fared little better and failed to produce a significant institutional challenge 
to the GATT.  While debate during the first conference covered market access, 
preferences, commodity policy and financial matters as well as some discussion of the 
possibility of subsuming the GATT into a radically different trade machinery developed 
under UNCTAD auspices,37 it proved not to be a forum for negotiations between 
participating states seeking reductions in impediments to trade or a vehicle for 
reversing the relatively poor trade performance of developing countries.  Rather, it 
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proved too unwieldy for that purpose, particularly compared with the relatively 
streamlined (albeit acutely asymmetrical) fashion the GATT had approached trade 
liberalisation.  What the conference resulted in instead was the creation of a formal 
and permanent presence for UNCTAD along with a secretariat to oversee its 
functioning; a decision to initiate detailed fact-finding exercises on issues of economic 
development; and an agreement that the conference should be reconvened at regular 
intervals with a Trade and Development Board meeting twice a year in between.  It did 
not result in powers to go beyond the issuing of recommendations.   
 
Where UNCTAD was successful was in consolidating growing solidarity among 
developing countries particularly among the Group of 77 (G77) providing a periodic 
high profile forum for the discussion of trade issues of interest to developing countries, 
and instigating a mechanism for monitoring and reporting on development issues.  It, 
however, was less successful in ensuring substantive engagement from particular 
industrial countries.  As J. C. Mills wrote in his commentary on the first UNCTAD,  
 
The United States delegation appeared to lack both an understanding of 
the basic needs of the less developed countries (the L.D.C.’s) and any 
desire to gain one. An American observer remarked of the chief delegate 
of his country: “He had nothing to offer and so he offered nothing.” The 
United States became clearly identified as the least willing of the industrial 
countries to even consider a “new” international division of labour which 
would permit the developing countries to industrialize.38 
 
Thus, UNCTAD’s lack of significant powers and the lacklustre participation of the 
developed states served—rather ironically—to secure the GATT’s role as the primary 
international trade body.  It also served to take developing country eyes off the GATT 
for a significant period during which the manner of the General Agreement’s deployment 
was consolidated.  Needless to say, this was to their disadvantage. 
 
The result was that for all of the pressure that was brought to bear on the institution, 
the 1960s drew to a close with the GATT’s essential character largely unchanged.  The 
system remained firmly anchored in the needs of the General Agreement’s architects with 
only a few small concessions having been made to the political-economic make-up of 
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developing states.  Already the GATT was in need of thorough reform—a necessity 
widely recognised and which had first been taken seriously by the contracting parties 
during the mid-1950s39—and the institution was a long way from being fit for purpose.  
Reform was, however, a long time coming, and what resulted proved to be too little and 
too late. 
 
Global trade governance circa 2016 
If a disjuncture between political and economic circumstances and the direction of the 
multilateral trading system’s institutional evolution had been evident by the late 1960s, 
it has become a seismic fracture by late 2010s.  In the near three decades since the end 
of the cold war, the United States has consolidated its position as the only world 
superpower.  A series of large developing and middle-income countries—China, India, 
Brazil, Russia and, to a lesser extent, South Africa (the BRICS)—have ‘risen’ to 
challenge existing global power relations, and possibly the United States itself.  
Relations between the United States and Russia—the successor state to the Soviet 
Union—cooled noticeably following the latter’s annexation of Crimea and tensions in 
Syria and elsewhere.  US and western power has been challenged ideologically by 
Islamist movements and materially by terrorist attacks in major population centres 
stretching back almost two decades; and secular politics has taken a backseat to 
resurgent religiosity.  Fragile economic recovery in the industrial states following the 
financial crisis of 2008 has been set back by worries about the dissolution of the EU 
following the 23rd June 2016 referendum result on UK membership—though the terms 
on which the UK would exit were thrown into some turmoil by the 8 June 2017 UK 
general election result that saw the ruling Conservative party’s majority substantially 
cut. 
 
More broadly, technological innovation and advance has fundamentally transformed 
the global economy.  Much of the developed world is now service orientated, though 
significant pockets of manufacturing have proved tenacious with signs of a return in 
other areas.  Trade has been transformed by innovations in transportation and 
logistics—including digital and drone delivery—and production further internationalised 
through elaborate and evolving global value chains.40  Developing country economies 
 15 
remain concentrated in—among other things—the production of agricultural goods and 
in the extraction of natural resources.  The means of doing commerce has altered 
fundamentally with a large number of transactions now being conducted electronically.  
Growing microbial resistance has eroded the effectiveness of many antibiotic 
medicines.  Over the past 30 years a series of health pandemics—ranging from 
HIV/AIDS to SARS, Ebola and Zika—have severely tested global and transnational 
response and governance mechanisms.  International negotiations have failed to result 
in the implementation of effective mechanisms for stemming the rate of increase of 
global warming or to mitigate the onset of a climate crisis.  Some modest improvements 
have been made in tackling global poverty, albeit that the ultra poor—particularly those 
living in rural areas—remain largely untouched by poverty reduction programmes.   
 
Yet, for all this circumstantial change, almost 70 years since the multilateral trading 
system was first established surprisingly little has altered.  Trade negotiations remain 
the preserve of the most significant economic states, with those that are neither 
principal suppliers nor major importers playing much more than a bit part.  The core 
architecture for governing global trade has evolved from the provisional and specific 
GATT, and replaced—institutionally, but not in terms of the way trade is governed—by 
the WTO.  Bilateral trade deals have grown considerably in number with a huge 
proliferation of regional trade agreements.  Some of these regional agreements—most 
recently in the Atlantic and Pacific—have been considerable in size and have developed 
in part as negotiating levers in multilateral negotiations.  And public interest in the 
content and direction of the global and regional trade agendas has been noticeable with 
considerable concern being periodically registered.   
  
The establishment of the WTO brought with it a deepening and widening of global 
trade regulation, extending the arenas of economic activity subject to trade rules while 
at the same time putting in place more substantive dispute settlement procedures and 
surveillance mechanisms.  Yet the core means of governing global trade—in terms of the 
principles around which it is organised and the manner in which negotiations are 
conducted—persist.  Significant tensions remain between developed and developing 
members of the multilateral trading system.  The last round under GATT auspices 
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managed to result in the negotiation of a universal agreement, albeit that the promise 
of establishing a new institution (the WTO) was crucial to the brokering of a deal.41  
Without a comparable institutional—or similar—pay off, the Doha round has 
floundered on tensions between members and has been set aside, with the conclusion 
of the Nairobi ministerial conference resulting in a return to the conclusion of deals 
that comprise a plurilateral element (with the exception of the issue-specific Trade 
Facilitation Agreement) and a small package of largely unsubstantive measures 
nominally intended to help the poorest.42 
 
The end of the cold war saw a number of successor states created, almost all of which 
have since joined the multilateral trading system.  The new crop of post-cold war states 
has contributed to an increase in WTO membership—by 29 July 2016—to 164.  WTO 
members are now a much more diverse group than existed under the GATT with 
myriad crosscutting interests.  While these differences have been mediated by coalitions 
formed on particular issues or in opposition to particular developments, they combine 
to make the governance of global trade more complex.  This complexity, combined 
with the difficulties of moving such a large group of members together in concert, has 
made multilateral trade negotiations more difficult to conclude.  When taken together 
with persisting tensions over the way commercial opportunities have been distributed 
since the system was created, this has ensured that rounds have tended towards long 
periods of stasis punctuated by moments of crisis.  Moreover, while these moments of 
crisis have occasionally resulted in forward institutional momentum, more often than 
not they have resulted in deadlock and inertia, or else any developments that have 
occurred have been regressive, more recently moving the multilateral system back to 
older, less inclusive forms of trade governance—as happened with the setting aside of 
the Doha round in December 2015.43 
 
The result is that the global trade governance of the late 2010s is in an unhappy place.  
Persistent tensions have rendered the WTO’s negotiating function all but inert.  This 
inertia has halted the agreement of trade opportunities of real value to the developing 
world.  The re-emergence of plurilateral agreements and modes of negotiating threaten 
to roll back the gains made in improving the participation of all WTO members in 
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negotiations.  And alternative forms of governance—bilateral, regional and mega-
regional—pose a fundamental challenge to the WTO’s place as centre-point of global 
trade governance. 
 
Global trade governance circa 2066 
Projecting forward 50 years is a precarious exercise and it is important to emphasise 
that the purpose here is not to predict the future.  What can be said with some 
certainty, however, is that the speed of global circumstantial change—already far 
outpacing institutional developments—is likely to exceed significantly the future 
evolution and development of the multilateral trading system.  World order-wise, the 
rate of climate related incidents and possible catastrophes will increase in frequency.  
This, in turn, will accelerate demand for goods and services that in some way help roll 
back the likelihood, as well as alleviate the consequences, of these events—though we 
might be sceptical about their capacity to make a significant difference.  If research and 
development continues to lag in antimicrobial resistance then health pandemics that 
could have been more easily controlled 50 years ago are likely to become more 
consequential in the future.  Conversely, if research and development improves in this 
area, markets for new pharmaceutical products are likely to develop.  These products 
are likely to be expensive as the costs of further research and development are passed 
on to consumers and the length of patent rights fully exploited.  This, in turn, is likely 
to ensure that a substantial health gap will continue to develop between those that can 
afford and/or have access to these medicines and those that cannot.  Assuming that 
there is a possibility that shortfalls in access to medicines like these may underpin the 
likelihood of future pandemics, then it is also likely that some kind of waiver for 
generic drug production will have to be agreed in much the same way that one was 
eventually negotiated for antiretroviral medicines. 44   Moreover, given that 
pharmaceutical companies will be aware of this as a possible eventuality, profit 
shortfalls will be added into purchasing prices further adding to costs and health gap 
consequences. 
 
Production in the late 2060s is also likely to have made extensive use of robotic 
technologies and automation.  Certainly, employment opportunities are likely to open 
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up in other sectors that will absorb some of the reduction in labour intensity in sectors 
using these greater technologies.  However, given that the global population is likely to 
exceed 10 billion by 2066, and developing and middle income countries as a broad 
group will continue to be locked into particular industries and forms of production, 
under and unemployment are likely to be issues with which the world of the future will 
have to contend.  Equally, it is likely that much of this production will be shifted out of 
the old industrial country heartlands which will have become almost exclusively service 
economies.  Nonetheless, it will probably remain the case that it is multinational 
corporations from the industrial world that will be producing in middle income and 
other countries.  This will, in turn, exacerbate worries about military applications 
resulting from roboticisation ensuring that a technology regime may be put in place 
wherein cutting edge technology is not transferred for security reasons and which 
results in super-sized versions of the general and security exception clauses of the GATT 
(articles XX and XXI respectively). 
 
Likewise, agriculture will probably continue to become highly mechanised (with 
unemployment resulting).  Many developing countries may have become competitive in 
this regard, but it will probably be Australian, North American and European 
agricultural multinationals that, on current projections, own operations.  Developing 
country exports may have surged as a result but the profits will inevitably flow out of 
country.  Moreover, this will likely act as a brake on export diversification.  This will be 
exacerbated because agricultural barriers are likely to remain highly protective of 
European and Greater North American (US, Canada and Mexico) agriculture 
industries. 
 
Production and extraction may well have changed considerably in the future such that 
existing rules of origin—that is, those rules that govern the origin of a product so that 
the tariff or duty due can be worked out—will have to change.  The extraction of raw 
material from under the seabed will bring the Law of the Sea together with trade rules 
in a potentially conflictual manner.  Equally, space exploration may have resulted in the 
extraction of raw materials from ‘heavenly bodies’.  Moreover, it is possible that 
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orbiting vessels may be established that produce goods and services that are not tied to 
or associated with particular geographic jurisdictions. 
 
Competition for energy and other resources such as water may become more intense, 
with the latter particularly being subject to competition between states and other 
groups (especially in areas of the earth where water shortages are most pronounced).  
Inevitably, this will not only increase prices and stimulate trade it will also drive 
desalination and other processes to render saline useable for human, animal and crop 
consumption to meet demand.  It may also see a shift towards greater extraction of 
groundwater.  As with the Law of the Sea, and production and extraction beyond the 
earth, this will put pressure on trade rules especially around rules of origin.   
 
The services sector will also likely accelerate and require different and new forms of 
regulation.  Increasing demand for, and competition in education will see markets 
globalise further, especially in the tertiary sector—albeit that much of the delivery will be 
digital.  The same will also likely be the case for health as competition across borders 
accelerates and demand rises caused by, among other things, an ageing population (the 
United Kingdom, for instance, is projected to have a population of more than half a 
million aged over 100 by 2066).  More generally, service and e-commerce agreements 
will have failed to keep pace with real world change. 
 
All of this will be exacerbated by any changes in global power relations.  While some 
have been quick to suggest that a significant shift away from the United States and 
Europe towards the BRICS is nascent, the recent economic performance of this latter 
group of countries has raised notes of caution.  In the absence of a major global or 
regional conflict it is nonetheless reasonable to suppose that China’s continued 
development will cement its place as the world’s second major power.  Inevitably, 
others will rise and fall making more complex and changed the map of world power.  
Some of the developments we may be seeing the genesis of now—the UK’s exit from the 
European Union and its consequences, and attempts to establish an Islamist Caliphate 
in Syria and Iraq to name but two. Whatever the outcome, it will inevitably affect the 
capacity of multilateral trade rules to govern global trade. 
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Irrespective of whether any of these developments are actually realised—to reiterate, the 
purpose here is not accurate predication—the problem is that if we look back to how 
global trade governance evolved in the first 50 years of our study we see that 
circumstance fast outstripped institutional change rendering that system less than 
useful.  Multilateral trade rules remained focused on liberalising trade in some goods, 
with aspects of governing services and various trade-related measures along with more 
extensive dispute settlement and surveillance procedures with the creation of the 
WTO—far from the extensive system that is required to govern commercial activity on 
this planet let alone deal with all of the issues that are and should be related to trade 
and its governance.  Equally, on past experience we are likely to see trade rounds—if 
they still exist—as piecemeal exercises wherein agreements are reached among subsets of 
members in plurilateral deals, rather than universal single undertakings that were once 
the preferred ambition but which was only realised once at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay round.  Also likely is that as a bureaucracy the WTO will continue to evolve 
bolstering its legitimacy through a continual upscaling of its research and information 
gathering capacity.  We have already seen this trend emerge as the WTO responds to 
the secretariat’s perceived need to enhance its credibility in the face of member and 
public criticism. 45   We need look no further than the World Bank, IMF and 
International Labour Organisation for confirmation that this is a probable 
developmental path.  Additional pressure will inevitably come from member states 
questioning the value of the funds they contribute to the WTO, which in turn will 
cause further research and technical expertise development in an attempt to continue 
to justify the organisation’s existence.  The result will be that the WTO will become a 
large bureaucracy that produces lots of reports and data, and which occasionally settles 
minor trade disputes among countries that are willing to adhere to DSB rulings, but 
which oversees little in terms of meaningful trade openings or trade facilitating 
agreements, particularly for the world’s poorest and least developed. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of the century with which this paper is concerned, what we are likely to 
see, then, is that institutional development not only lags behind the exigencies of global 
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political-economic circumstance it will also serve to further distort and inhibit the trade 
possibilities and opportunities available to developing countries.  While it may have 
been ‘too facile a view’, as one commentator put it in 1966,46 that the ‘development [of] 
the newly emerging countries [would] be less arduous than it was for [the] industrial 
countries simply because the latecomers on the development scene [could] draw on a 
store of experience and, through aid programmes and private investment activities, the 
actual resources and wealth of the advanced countries’ the hopes of modernisation 
thinkers47 so dominant at the beginning of our period of study were also dashed by the 
distortions exerted from the very outset by the institutional architecture for governing 
global trade.  Projecting forward into the future suggests that there is little hope this 
might change anytime soon. 
 
In 1966 George Woods, then president of the World Bank, argued that unless the 
UN’s first development decade received greater ‘sustenance, it may … recede into 
history as the decade of disappointment’.48  He continued:  
 
As the gap widens intolerably, one is bound to wonder when the fine 
sentiments so eloquently and so often expressed by leaders in all the 
industrial nations will give way to positive action to help raise the living 
standards of developing countries at a much faster rate. For how much 
longer can the rich nations justify the relatively low place that development 
finance has hitherto been accorded in their list of priorities?49  
 
If we were to substitute ‘decade’ for ‘century’ and ‘development finance’ for the 
‘multilateral trading system’ Woods could very well have been talking about global 
trade governance.  Given that the inadequacies of multilateral trading system have been 
obvious for some considerable time, and on current projections they are likely to get 
worse, we should return, as Orwell suggested at the outset of this paper,50 to our ‘first 
duty’: that is, to restate the obvious—that the system is broken—and begin a debate 
about how it can be fixed.  If we do not, we risk not only the trade architecture but also 
the possibilities that ought to be open to all of the world’s population.  Clearly, the task 
ahead is to design a system capable of governing global trade attune to changed and 
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